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The	Xinjiang	Uighur	Autonomous	Region	has	been	afflicted	by	Uighur	political	activism	and	ethnic	violence	for	the	past	few	decades.	Inter	ethnic	relations	
between	the	Uighurs	and	Han	Chinese	have	been	extremely	tense.	Why	is	Xinjiang	so	vulnerable	to	inter	ethnic	violence?	Why	are	inter	group	dynamics	
between	the	Uighurs	and	Han	Chinese	so	volatile?	This	paper	examines	Uighur–Han	Chinese	relations	in	contemporary	Xinjiang	and	probes	conditions	
that	facilitate	inter	ethnic	violence.	Utilizing	Fredrik	Barth’s	approach	to	ethnicity	that	emphasizes	boundaries,	this	paper	examines	in	detail	how	the	rigid	
inter	ethnic	boundary	between	the	Uighurs	and	Han	Chinese	has	been	constructed	and	strengthened	in	Xinjiang.	Perceived	differences	have	generated	
mutual	distrust	and	discrimination	between	the	two	groups	that	make	inter	group	communication	and	understanding	difficult	and	therefore	very	limited.	
In	situations	such	as	that	in	Xinjiang,	where	a	rigid	inter	group	boundary	is	in	place	and	civic	engagements	across	groups	are	lacking,	inter	group	conflict	is	
extremely	hard	to	avoid.
Boundaries, Discrimination, and  
Inter ethnic Conflict in Xinjiang, China
Enze	Han,	Woodrow	Wilson	School,	Princeton	University,	United	States
On July 5, 2009, one of the deadliest riots in China in recent 
years erupted in Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang Uighur 
Autonomous Region.1 On that day, ethnic Uighur demon­
strators clashed with police forces and violently attacked 
innocent Han Chinese passersby, which led to the deaths 
of around two hundred people.2 This incident brought the 
Uighur issue and China’s ethnic politics into the interna­
tional media spotlight; it also led to severe repression by 
the Chinese state against the Uighur people and caused an 
information lockdown on the whole Xinjiang region for 
almost a year. Xinjiang is perhaps the region where inter­
ethnic relations are the tensest in all of China. Sporadic 
riots and ethnic violence have occurred during the past few 
decades, as well as armed uprisings, bombings, and assas­
sinations. According to some scholars, Xinjiang is heading 
toward “Palestinization,” in imminent danger of devolv­
ing into protracted ethnic conflict and communal violence 
(Wang 2007).
This paper looks at two processes that generated the rigid 
inter group boundary between the Han Chinese and the 
Uighurs. First, large scale in­migration of Han Chinese 
to Xinjiang during the past few decades has brought the 
Uighurs into direct contact and confrontation with the Han 
Chinese in daily life. These intensified encounters between 
the two have highlighted existing linguistic, cultural, and 
religious differences between the two, resulting in self­
imposed segregation between the two groups in Xinjiang, 
1 Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), or 
East Turkestan as it is called by Uighur national­
ists, covers a vast territory in the northwest part 
of China with a total area of 1,664,900 square km. 
It comprises one­sixth of China’s total geographic 
territory and is the size of Britain, France, Germany, 
and Spain combined (Millward 2007, 4). Xinjiang 
is traditionally home to various Turkic­speaking 
and Persian­speaking Muslim oasis dwellers, as 
well as Turkic­speaking and Mongolian­speaking 
nomads who roam the grasslands in the north. 
There is no standard nomenclature for the Ui­
ghurs and East Turkestan: Uighur is sometimes 
spelled as Uygur or Uyghur; East Turkestan 
sometimes is known as Eastern Turkestan or 
Eastern Turkistan. In this paper, I use Uighur 
and East Turkestan unless in direct quotation.
2 For a balanced account of the 
riot, see Millward (2010).
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especially in urban areas. To illustrate the development 
and manifestation of this segregation, a detailed analysis 
of how the two communities develop their stereotypes and 
prejudices against each other in daily life is provided. Issues 
such as language use in the job market, language educa­
tion, and religious and dietary differences are explored. The 
second process is the contribution of preferential policies, 
discriminatory measures in the job market, political repres­
sion by the Chinese government, and inter group violence to 
the elimination of intra group differences within the various 
Uighur communities in Xinjiang. These factors have helped 
generate a rigid inter group boundary, which engenders 
rampant distrust and discrimination between the two 
groups and makes the inter group dynamic extremely sus­
ceptible to violence.
This analysis of the Xinjiang case aims to make the follow­
ing contributions: foremost, by utilizing Barth’s concept of 
boundaries, it provides a detailed portrayal of a rigid inter­
group relationship at the meso level. It thus offers a glimpse 
into the mechanisms of how rigid inter ethnic boundaries 
are constructed and maintained. In addition, by linking 
rigid group boundaries and mutual distrust and discrimi­
nation, it provides an understanding of how the lack of civic 
engagements across groups makes violence between them 
possible and likely. In conclusion, this paper calls for more 
attention to the social processes of inter group relations and 
their impact on communal violence.3
Using ethnographic methods, this paper is based on inter­
views conducted and observations recorded during a field 
trip to Xinjiang in 2008. The richness of such materials al­
lows readers to gain a vivid understanding of Xinjiang’s eth­
nic problems at the meso level. Materials collected through 
ethnographic methods are, of course, filtered through 
the subjective perceptions and opinions of the researcher 
(Schensul et al. 1999, 273). In this case, the materials are fur­
ther cross­checked and juxtaposed with existing writings 
on Xinjiang so as to present a more balanced portrayal of 
its inter ethnic dynamics. Yet there are significant limita­
tions to the theoretical conclusions that can be drawn from 
a single case study. At best, the analysis presented here is an 
“interpretive case study,” whereby “generalization is applied 
to a specific case with the aim of throwing light on the case 
rather than of improving the generalization in any way” 
(Lijphart 1971, 692). Through an engagement with Barth’s 
theoretical framework, it is possible to interpret and probe 
how rigid group boundaries come into existence and how 
they manifest in daily life in Xinjiang. However, since it is a 
single case study, readers should treat this analysis of Xinji­
ang’s inter ethnic relations as only one interpretation.
My analysis starts with a brief review of the history of 
Xinjiang and the background of ethnic politics in the 
region. It discusses the current situation in Xinjiang, and, in 
particular, the occasional outbursts of violent confrontation 
between the Uighurs and Han Chinese since the 1990s. Fol­
lowing that, the paper introduces Barth’s concept of group 
boundaries, and shows how it is useful for understanding 
rigid inter group boundaries in places such as Xinjiang. Us­
ing this theory as a guide, I go on to portray the inter ethnic 
dynamic in Xinjiang, and to offer an analysis of how inter­
group boundaries are constructed and maintained in daily 
life. The paper then reflects on the implications of rigid 
inter group boundaries, and how they feed mutual distrust 
and discrimination, which potentially breed violence. My 
concluding remarks concern ethnic violence in general and 
policy recommendations for Xinjiang in particular.
1. Recent Incidents of Violence in Xinjiang
Located along the Silk Roads linking ancient China to 
Europe, Xinjiang has historically been a nexus where the 
East meets the West. China­based dynastic control over 
Xinjiang should be considered sporadic, corresponding to 
the ebb and flow of imperial powers. It was the Manchu 
Qing Dynasty that finally conquered the Zungar Mongols 
and absorbed Xinjiang into its imperial domain. In 1884, 
Xinjiang was officially declared a province. After the col­
lapse of the Qing Empire in 1911, Xinjiang was immediately 
taken over by various warlords (Forbes 1986). Xinjiang 
3 Social Identity Theory uses a psychological ap­
proach to address why groups engage in in­group 
privilege and out­group prejudice. This paper instead 
puts the focus squarely on the social processes of the 
construction and maintenance of ethnic boundaries.
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witnessed two short­lived independent governments in the 
1930s and 1940s. The first, a Turkish Islamic Republic of 
Eastern Turkestan, was established in 1933 by Muhammad 
Amin Bughra (Mehmet Emin Bugra), a prominent Muslim 
scholar, together with his two younger brothers Abdullah 
and Nur Ahmad (Forbes 1986, 113). This is considered to be 
the first East Turkestan Republic (ETR) by many Uighur na­
tionalists today. The regime came to an end in 1934. In the 
fall of 1944, a rebellion broke out in Ili in northern Xinjiang. 
This rebellion, backed by the Soviet Union, established the 
second East Turkestan Republic (Benson 1990; Wang 1999). 
This ETR was absorbed by the newly independent People’s 
Republic of China, under the pressure of the Soviet Union 
(Millward and Tursun 2004). In 1955, Xinjiang Uighur 
Autonomous Region was established, with the Uighurs des­
ignated as the titular nationality. Seypidin Ezizi, a Uighur, 
served as the chairman of XUAR’s People’s Council. Wang 
Enmao, a Han general, nevertheless held the top post in 
the regional military and Chinese Communist Party. This 
pattern of leadership composition still persists today, with 
a Uighur as chairman of the XUAR but the real power held 
by a Han Chinese as the CCP boss.
After the great exodus of ethnic Uighur and Kazakhs into 
the Soviet Union in 1962, in the aftermath of the Sino­Soviet 
split and the subsequent closing of borders, little is known 
about whether any major political mobilization by the Ui­
ghurs occurred during the Cultural Revolution years. Partly 
due to the turbulent and repressive nature of the Chinese 
state during these years and partly due to the shutting off 
of Xinjiang from external influences, Uighur opposition 
to Chinese rule gradually became more overtly national­
istic during the 1980s (Dillon 2004, 59). However, political 
activism in Xinjiang during the 1980s was quite sporadic 
and often limited in scale. It was in the 1990s that political 
movements, which often resorted to violence, gradually 
spread throughout the region (Dillon 2004). This outbreak 
of violence began with the Baren Incident in southern 
Xinjiang. A rebel group, led by Zeydin Yusuf, with the name 
Islamic Party of East Turkistan planned a series of synchro­
nized attacks on government buildings (Millward 2004, 
14). According to some reports, hundreds of people were 
killed in clashes with the Chinese police force. The scale 
of the rebellion notwithstanding, rebels during the Baren 
Incident also seem to have propagated separatist ideologies 
and organized the rebellion through the channels of local 
mosques (Dillon 2004, 73). After the Baren Incident, the 
political activities of Uighur separatists became increasingly 
violent. The 1990s were a decade of bombings and assas­
sinations throughout Xinjiang. Targets were usually Uighur 
government officials and cooperative religious clerics, who 
were considered to be traitors by radical Uighur separatists 
(Millward 2007, 330). Between 1990 and 1999, according to 
one estimate, 61 violent incidents occurred in Xinjiang.4
One large­scale and deadly riot took place in the city of 
Yining (Ghulja) in early 1997. Following the Strike Hard 
Campaign in 1996, which targeted illegal religious activi­
ties and private Quranic schools, local police in the city of 
Yining arrested two Uighur religious students around the 
time of Ramadan. Several hundred people demonstrated in 
response, eventually leading to a riot. The Chinese govern­
ment official figure for casualties of the riot was 198 injured 
and 7 dead, while Uighur exiles claimed up to 300 dead 
(Dillon 2004, 93–94).
Since the Yining (Ghulja) Incident in 1997 and up until very 
recently, there have been no large­scale political mobiliza­
tions reported in Xinjiang beyond a few sporadic bombings, 
assassinations, and small­scale protests. Yet, on July 5, 2009, 
Xinjiang witnessed a large­scale riot in the capital city of 
Urumqi with a surprisingly high number of casualties. On 
that day, hundreds of Uighurs in Urumqi went to protest the 
death of two Uighur workers in a factory in Southern China, 
and the demonstration soon turned into a deadly riot. 
Perhaps frustrated with police forces that tried to stop the 
demonstration, many protestors violently attacked innocent 
civilians, specifically targeting Han Chinese. According to 
official statistics, a total of 197 people died as a result of the 
riot, the majority of them Han Chinese.5 Thousands of troops 
4 See the dataset compiled in Hierman (2007). 5 See the report in Xinhua News, acces­
sible at http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng­
lish/2009­07/18/content_11727782.htm.
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were immediately brought in to impose order through mass 
arrests. Two days later, frustrated and angered by the loss of 
so many Han Chinese lives, thousands of Han Chinese vigi­
lantes marched in Urumqi, armed with sticks and iron bars, 
ready to fight back at the Uighurs (Millward 2010, 354). The 
relationship between the two groups has become extremely 
tense, threatening the future peace and stability of Xinjiang.
2. Boundary and Ethnic Identity Construction
To make sense of the violent mobilization of the Uighurs in 
the past few decades, a few questions need to be addressed: 
(1) Why is Xinjiang so vulnerable to inter ethnic violence? 
(2) Why are inter group dynamics between the Uighurs and 
Han Chinese so volatile? and (3) How is violence justified 
and used as a means to address grievances? Here we need to 
look at how the rigid inter group boundary between the Ui­
ghurs and the Han Chinese is constructed and maintained 
in everyday life in Xinjiang. That rigid boundary makes 
inter group communications between the two groups dif­
ficult, leading to mistrust and discrimination. Lack of civic 
engagement across groups creates conditions that allow in­
discriminate inter ethnic violence. To understand how rigid 
the inter group boundary is in Xinjiang and the conditions 
that made its development possible, we will engage Fredrik 
Barth’s thesis on ethnic boundary construction through 
social encountering.
Barth’s conceptualization of ethnicity emphasizes that it is 
the ethnic boundary that defines a group, rather than inher­
ent cultural attributes (Barth 1969, 15). While the cultural 
content or even membership of an ethnic group can change, 
it is still important to explore how group boundaries are 
maintained in different contexts. Barth asserts that “cat­
egorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence 
of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social 
processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete 
categories are maintained despite changing participation 
and membership in the course of individual life histories” 
(Barth 1969, 9–10). He is cautioning scholars not to take 
group differences or conflict for granted; rather, they need to 
explore empirically how group boundaries are demarcated.
Group boundaries are constructed in two ways. One is 
through intra group ascription, and the other is through ex­
ternal designation. Each individual carries certain identity 
attributes that he or she can draw upon to identify with a 
certain group. At the same time, the manifestation of the 
meaning of these attributes depends upon the situational 
context. In some instances the attribute might be language, 
in others it might be religion, race, physical differences, 
customs, or behavior, and so on. Thus, within different 
situations and with different audiences, one can draw upon 
certain attributes either to identify with or distance oneself 
from a group. We can think of each individual as carrying 
a portfolio of identifiers, or a layering of identifications; 
“as audiences change, the socially­defined array of ethnic 
choices open to the individual changes” (Nagel 1994, 154). 
This is not to say that individuals have total freedom in 
which group they identify with. There are certain limits in 
one’s identity repertoire. As Kanchan Chandra and Steven 
Wilkinson point out, all individuals have a repertoire of 
nominal ethnic identity attributes, which “consist of all 
the meaningful membership rules that can be fashioned 
from an individual’s given set of descent­based attributes” 
(Chandra and Wilkinson 2008, 520). Since every individual 
has a certain set of attributes, the choices are not totally free 
or random. One’s ability to engage a certain level of identity 
repertoire is deeply shaped and constrained by external 
mechanisms such as social encountering and categoriza­
tion.
Social encountering plays a pivotal role. Barth especially 
emphasizes the interaction aspect of group boundary con­
struction. He states that “ethnic distinctions do not depend 
on an absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are 
quite to the contrary often the very foundation on which 
embracing social systems are built” (Barth 1969, 10). Group 
boundaries are demarcated only when group members en­
counter others: during this encounter process group mem­
bers realize how similar to or how different they are from 
the people with whom they interact. The external aspect is 
vital for group boundary construction. Oftentimes, it is the 
other that defines the self.
External categorization is particularly powerful in rigidify­
ing group boundaries. The power and authority relationship 
in the categorization of groups leads to the production and 
reproduction of group identities (Jenkins 1994, 197). Or as 
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Andreas Wimmer (2008) asserts, external constraints from 
the structures of the social field, such as institutions, politi­
cal power, and networks of political alliances, influence 
how group boundaries are drawn. Political institutions, in 
particular the modern nation­state, play an extremely pow­
erful role in the construction of ethnic identity by imposing 
classification and categorization so as to demarcate group 
boundaries (Laitin 1986; Suny 1993). Thus, various nation­
building efforts carried out by modern nation­states are 
in fact a process of eliminating internal boundaries while 
creating or maintaining external boundaries (Conversi 
1999, 564). Preferential treatments of ethnic groups can also 
create new boundaries or strengthen existing ones (Nagel 
1994, 157). Furthermore, violence can be provoked so as to 
strengthen the boundaries between the in­group and the 
out­group (Conversi 1995, 81).
To explain the making and maintenance of inter group 
boundaries in a specific context, we need to pay attention to 
the multiple factors outlined above. First is a detailed analy­
sis of how social encountering and external categorization 
have generated a rigid boundary between the Uighurs and 
Han Chinese in Xinjiang.
3. Inter ethnic Boundary Construction and Maintenance
As a frontier region bordering Central Asia, Xinjiang is 
home to thirteen ethnic groups – the Uighur, Han, Kazak, 
Hui, Kirghiz, Mongol, Xibe, Russian, Tajik, Uzbek, Tatar, 
Manchu, and Daur. Of these, the Uighurs are the most 
numerous, with a population of 9.65 million; Han Chinese 
come in a close second, at 8.24 million; Kazakh third, at 
1.48 million; Hui at 0.94 million; Kirghiz and Mongols at 
0.18 million each; with the rest relatively small in number 
(Table 1). Population distribution of ethnic groups roughly 
follows north­south and urban­rural divides. Han Chinese 
are concentrated in urban areas and in the northern part of 
Xinjiang, while Uighurs are mostly concentrated in south­
ern rural areas. For example, in the capital city of Urumqi, 
Han Chinese are now about 73 percent of the total popula­
tion, while Uighurs are about 12 percent. However, in the 
south in areas such as Kashgar and Khotan, Uighurs make 
up more than 90 percent of the local population (Table 2).
Table 1: Ethnic groups in Xinjiang and their population (2007) 
Ethnic	group Population
Uighur 	 9,650,629
Han 	 8,239,245
Kazakh 	 1,483,883
Hui 	 942,956
Kirghiz 	 181,862
Mongol 	 177,120
Tajik 	 44,824
Xibe 	 42,444
Manchu 	 25,626
Uzbek 	 16,138
Russian 	 11,609
Daur 	 6,678
Tatar 	 4,728
Total 	20,951,900
Data	from	Xinjiang	Statistical	Yearbook	2008,	accessible	at	China	Data	Online	(http://china-
dataonline.org).
Table 2: Uighur/Han distribution in Xinjiang (percentage)
Uighur Han	Chinese Other
Urumqi	City 12.3 73 14.7
Karamay	City 15.2 75.5 9.3
Turpan	 70.5 23 6.5
Kumul	(Hami) 20.2 66.7 13.1
Changji	Hui	Autonomous	Prefecture 4.6 74.4 21.1
Ili	Kazakh	Autonomous	Prefecture	 16.2 43.8 40
Bortala	Mongol	Autonomous	Prefecture 12.7 67.3 20
Bayangol	Mongol	Autonomous	Prefecture 32.7 57.5 9.8
Aksu 78 20.7 1.3
Kizilsu	Kirghiz	Autonomous	Prefecture 63.5 7.4 29.1
Kashgar	 91.1 7.3 1.6
Khotan 96.5 3.5 0.2
Total 46.1 39.3 14.6
Data	from	Xinjiang	Statistical	Yearbook	2008,	accessible	at	China	Data	Online	(http://china-
dataonline.org).
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Anyone who has travelled or lived in Xinjiang would not 
have failed to notice the social distance between the Ui­
ghurs and Han Chinese. The most striking characteristic of 
their inter ethnic group relations is the clearly demarcated 
boundary between the two groups in social spaces. One can 
even talk about self­imposed segregation of the two groups, 
especially in urban areas where the two groups come into 
direct contact. Very rarely do Uighurs and Han Chinese 
socialize with each other in Xinjiang, unless it is absolutely 
unavoidable, such as in workplaces, schools, or other public 
spaces. In people’s private lives, interactions between the 
two groups are minimal. From interviews and observations, 
the strong social divisions between the two groups can be 
identified as mainly occurring in the areas of food, mar­
riage, residence, time zones, and language use.
As a significant ascriptive marker, religion is often associ­
ated with divisions among people in various societies. 
In Xinjiang’s case, religious differences between the two 
groups are often emphasized as a key divider. The over­
whelming majority of Uighurs are Muslims, and even less 
devout Uighurs observe a relatively strict halal diet. Pork, 
which is forbidden in the halal diet, is a staple food of the 
Han Chinese. It is commonly asserted that for this reason it 
is impossible for Uighurs to visit Han Chinese households, 
let alone for them to dine together. When I asked people 
why the Uighurs and Han Chinese do not socialize, often 
people would cite dietary differences. Restaurants in Xinji­
ang are distinguished by their halal status. Although Han 
Chinese occasionally dine in halal restaurants, Uighurs 
would never patronize non­halal ones. Some Uighurs even 
avoid patronizing non­Uighur­operated halal restaurants 
because of suspicions that Han Chinese might be involved 
in their operation and thus the establishments may not 
maintain appropriate standards. For Han Chinese, whose 
cultural expressions and socialization often center on eat­
ing and drinking, these dietary customs make it hard to 
make friends with the Uighurs. In return the Uighurs often 
emphasize being Muslim as a precondition for friendship.6 
Islam, together with its dietary connotations, is thus at 
the core of everyday interaction between the two groups 
(Cesaro 2000, 227). It might be the case in North America 
or Europe that Muslims and non­Muslims are able to 
socialize while retaining their halal food restrictions. Yet, in 
Xinjiang, the polemics around food consumption reinforce 
the strict inter ethnic boundary between Uighurs and Han 
Chinese (Cesaro 2000, 225).
Religious differences between the two groups also mean 
that intermarriage between Han Chinese and Uighurs is 
almost nonexistent. Local stories indicate that a Uighur 
marrying a Han Chinese would be disowned by his or 
her family, and would constantly be harassed and scolded 
within the Uighur community. During the field trip in Xin­
jiang, I asked a Uighur man in his early twenties whether 
he would ever marry a Han Chinese and he abruptly said 
“No.” I asked him why and he said it is just impossible – the 
cultural differences between the two are just too vast, and 
his parents would never allow it to happen. Joanne Smith 
similarly comments that “other than religio­cultural differ­
ences per se, it is the threat of disapproval from within the 
Uighur community that rules out intermarriage at present” 
(Smith 2002, 163). Similar constraints on intermarriage also 
exist in the Han Chinese community. This marital prefer­
ence is not unique to Xinjiang, but it is worth noting as a 
significant barrier to social integration.
There is also spatial and even temporal segregation between 
the two groups. During the time when China had a cen­
trally planned economy, housing was often provided and 
allocated through the work unit. This housing policy al­
lowed some intermixing between Han Chinese and Uighurs 
in residential complexes. However, since the dismantling 
of the planned economy in the 1980s, mixing in residential 
complexes quickly disappeared. With the privatization of 
the urban housing market, residential areas have become 
increasingly segregated along ethnic lines. In Urumqi, for 
example, most of the Uighurs are concentrated in the Erd­
aoqiao district in the south of the city. In other oasis cities, 
Uighurs are usually concentrated in the “old town,” while 
6 During my field research, I was told more 
than once by Uighurs that being Muslim is 
a very important foundation for friendship. 
For a discussion of the pervasive influence of 
Islam on Uighur society from an anthropo­
logical perspective, see Dautcher (2009). 
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Han Chinese live in the “new town,” often constructed on 
unsettled land adjacent to the old town. Although some Ui­
ghurs might live in Han residential areas because the facili­
ties are better, the overall pattern of residential segregation 
is clear. Furthermore, even in residential areas shared by 
both groups, children are often discouraged from playing 
with those from the other group (Bellér­Hann 2002, 65).
The other sign of the clear boundary between the two 
groups is the different time zones they inhabit in Xinjiang. 
Because of its distance from the Chinese capital, Xinjiang is 
two time zones behind Beijing. However, the unity­obsessed 
Chinese government officially operates on only one time 
zone for all of China. Thus, for example, 8:00 a.m. in Beijing 
would be 6:00 a.m. in Xinjiang. As a result, people usu­
ally push the time back by two hours, say by going to work 
at 10:00  instead of 8:00 Beijing time. However, in private 
life, the choice of time zone is clearly correlated with group 
identity: Uighurs tend to use the local Xinjiang time, while 
Han Chinese often stick to official Beijing time. Visitors 
recently arrived in Xinjiang sometimes find it confusing 
to figure out exactly what time people are talking about. 
When people across ethnic boundaries schedule meetings, 
they need to specify which time zone they are referring to. 
What is surprising is that many Han Chinese, as well as 
some Hui, stubbornly stick to the Beijing time despite its 
inconveniences, to show their loyalty toward the Chinese 
state and their separation from the Uighurs.7 One Han 
Chinese woman told me that “we have our own time, they 
have theirs, and we do not intermingle with each other.” 
And for the Uighurs, rejecting Beijing time represents a way 
to resist the Han Chinese and the Chinese state’s hegemony 
imposed on Xinjiang. To paraphrase James Scott (1987), this 
is one way the politically weak Uighur people express their 
resistance.
Linguistic barriers between the two groups are also sub­
stantial. Most Han Chinese in urban areas in Xinjiang can­
not speak the Uighur language, and Uighurs from the south 
such as Kashgar and Khotan can barely communicate in the 
Chinese language either. According to a survey carried out 
in Urumqi in 2000, half of the Han Chinese respondents 
reported that they cannot speak Uighur at all, and only 3.2 
percent reported they were proficient at the language. In the 
same survey, 14.2 percent of Uighurs reported not being able 
to speak any Chinese, and fewer than half of the respon­
dents (47.9 percent) reported they were relatively proficient 
at Chinese (Yee 2003, 436). In southern Xinjiang, where the 
Uighurs still constitute a numerical majority, some Han 
Chinese are able to speak the Uighur language relatively 
well. However, in northern Xinjiang and especially in 
urban areas where Han Chinese are predominant, few Han 
Chinese people have the incentive or interest to study the 
Uighur language.
Uighurs are often under pressure to conform linguistically. 
Because the urban job market is dominated by the use of 
Chinese, many younger Uighurs do have command of the 
language. Yet in private settings they often prefer Uighur. 
Uighur language skills are often used as to measure how 
ethnically good or pure a speaker is. In Xinjiang, people 
talk about two categories of Uighurs, depending on the 
language environment in which they are educated. Minkao-
han refers to Uighurs who have gone through the Chinese 
educational system and whose Chinese language ability is 
usually much better than that of the minkaomin, who are 
Uighurs educated in the Uighur language. There is arguably 
a backlash in the Uighur community against the emergence 
of more and more minkaohan Uighurs in Xinjiang, who are 
more comfortable speaking Chinese than Uighur. Often­
times these minkaohan are looked down upon by their 
minkaomin counterparts, who deem them culturally too 
similar to Han. Yet ordinary Han Chinese tend to lump the 
minkaohan and minkaomin together simply as Uighurs and 
to treat both with equal suspicion and dislike. Racial differ­
ences make it essentially impossible for a Chinese­speaking 
Uighur to pass as a Han Chinese. There is a satirical Uighur 
saying that the minkaohan Uighurs are the fourteenth eth­
7 The Hui are a Sinic­language­speaking 
Muslim group. Smith notes “like the Han 
Chinese, the Hui consider Beijing time the 
standard time for Xinjiang as for all regions of 
China. This is probably one factor contribut­
ing to the mutual mistrust between Uighurs and 
Hui Muslims in Xinjiang” (Smith 2002, 161).
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nic group in Xinjiang, added to the thirteen official ethnic 
groups (Smith Finley 2007). Thus, linguistic competence 
and purity are constantly emphasized within the Uighur 
community in order to maintain the group’s distance from 
the Han Chinese.
The question remains as to why and how these divisions 
came into existence. Barth’s approach to group boundar­
ies proposes that the manifestation of one’s ethnic iden­
tification is situational: social encounters are crucial in 
demarcating and maintaining group boundaries. This is 
particularly the case in Xinjiang, where multiple ethnic 
groups regularly interact with each other. Xinjiang is not 
a place where one can draw a single line between dichoto­
mous groups. In addition to Uighurs and Han Chinese, 
there are also the numerous Hui, as well as the Kazakhs, a 
Turkic group nomadic in its traditional lifestyle. When a 
Uighur encounters a Hui, often the emphasis is on linguistic 
and racial differences despite their common Muslim faith. 
Hui Muslims can be greatly mistrusted and resented by the 
Uihgurs and are often accused of being the same as the Han 
Chinese.8 When Uighurs encounter Kazakhs, by contrast, 
often the emphasis is on their different lifestyles, with the 
former being stereotyped as agricultural and the latter as 
nomadic. The shamanistic tradition among the Kazakhs 
often leads to their being considered by the Uighurs to be 
less authentically Muslim.
Nevertheless, the greatest difference is between Uighurs 
and Han Chinese, whose linguistic, religious, and cultural 
differences all line up together without “cross­cutting 
cleavages.” Especially during the past few decades, Uighurs 
have come into direct contact and confrontation with the 
Han Chinese. One strategy that the Chinese government 
employs to solidify its control of Xinjiang is through waves 
of migration of Han Chinese into the region: in 1953, Han 
Chinese were only about 6 percent of Xinjiang’s total popu­
lation, but by 2000 the number had jumped to 40 percent. 
In the meantime, the Uighur population dwindled from 
75 percent of the total in 1953 to 45 percent in 2000 (Toops 
2004, 246–48). These days, Han Chinese migrant workers 
and peasants have started to penetrate into small towns and 
rural areas that were usually strongholds of the Uighurs. 
Such intensified encounters with the other group have made 
the Uighurs realize and emphasize how different they are 
from the Han Chinese. Those perceived differences have 
caused both communities consciously to keep at a distance 
from each other and maintain segregation.
At the same time, external categorizations have also 
decreased internal differences among Uighurs originating 
from different oases, who speak different dialects and have 
different cultural habits (Rudelson 1997). A more uniform 
identification among the Uighurs has emerged since the 
1980s, superseding their previous oasis­based identities. 
There are several reasons for this increasing identification 
with the larger group beyond encounters with Han Chinese. 
First is the Chinese government’s “preferential policies” 
toward minorities. Second is the role of repression and vio­
lence in hardening inter group differences and smoothing 
over intra group variations.
Starting in the 1980s, the Chinese government began to 
implement a set of preferential policies toward ethnic 
minorities. In Xinjiang, two policy areas are particularly 
relevant to the Uighurs: education and family planning. 
Linda Benson, for example, points out that in the 1990s 
about 50 percent of admission quotas for Xinjiang Uni­
versity were reserved for ethnic minority students, mainly 
Uighurs (Benson 2004, 208). Also, university admission 
scores for Uighurs who went through the Uighur language 
education system – minkaomin – are usually significantly 
lower than those set for Han Chinese students. On the issue 
of family planning, the first compulsory family planning 
laws went into effect in Xinjiang only in 1988, ten years later 
than for the rest of the country (Clark 2001, 229). Accord­
ing to this law, urban Uighur couples are allowed to have 
two children while rural ones can have three, a preferential 
policy deeply resented by the Han Chinese, who are subject 
to the “one­child” rule. This differential treatment of the 
8 This may have historical reasons. Dur­
ing the Republican period, Hui troops under 
various warlords at times heavily repressed 
the Uighurs. One might even argue that Hui 
Muslims played a significant role in keeping 
Xinjiang within China’s fold (Forbes 1986). 
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Uighurs arguably has contributed to the strengthening of 
the common Uighur identification. Preferential policies can 
be seen to strengthen group identity elsewhere in the world 
(Rudolph and Rudolph 1967; De Zwart 2000), and one can 
certainly argue that the same process occurred among the 
Uighurs in Xinjiang.
The other important factors are state repression against the 
Uighurs and inter ethnic violence between Han Chinese and 
the Uighurs since the 1990s, which have further hardened 
inter group division and strengthened intra group solidarity. 
As noted earlier, the Chinese state’s response to the grow­
ing political activism and radicalization of the Uighurs 
since the early 1980s was heavy­handed and indiscriminate 
repression against the Uighurs as a uniform group. At the 
end of April 1996, the Chinese government launched its 
first “Strike Hard” campaign. In Xinjiang, the goal of the 
campaign was not only to crack down on criminal activi­
ties in general, but also to target political dissenters and, in 
particular, Uighur separatists. Michael Dillon writes, “the 
Xinjiang party committee explicitly linked separatism with 
what it termed ‘unlawful religious activities’ and launched 
a campaign to reduce their effect in schools, in publishing, 
and throughout the region” (Dillon 2004, 85). As a result, 
some Uighur pro­independence organizations claimed that 
between April and June 1996, some four thousand religious 
students were arrested and sent to prison camps. There were 
also claims that thousands of people were arrested through­
out the region during the campaign, of which the over­
whelming majority were Uighur (Dillon 2004, 87–88).
More significantly, after the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001 and the subsequent U.S.­led “war on terror,” the Chi­
nese government took the opportunity to start its own anti­
terrorism campaign that linked Uighur pro­independence 
movements and organizations with the Taliban and terror­
ists. In January 2002, the Chinese State Council Information 
Office published a document about East Turkestan terrorist 
forces operating in China (Becquelin 2004, 39). The result 
was to conflate all Uighur pro­autonomy and independence 
movements with existing Uighur terrorist movements, for 
example labeling the East Turkestan Independence Move­
ment and the East Turkestan Islamic Party as terrorist 
organizations. The Chinese government effectively used the 
“war on terror” discourse to brand Uighur political dissents 
as terrorists, justifying a wave of repression against Uighur 
dissidents across the region. The indiscriminate nature of 
this action, which treats all Uighurs as potential separatists 
or terrorists, has certainly served to alienate even more Ui­
ghurs, and has perhaps pushed many moderate Uighurs into 
the extremist camp, contributing to intra group solidarity.
In addition to state repression of the Uighurs, inter group 
violence between the Uighurs and Han Chinese has also 
hardened inter group boundaries. Scholars writing on 
ethnic conflict have discussed at length the role of violence 
in strengthening group differences (Conversi 1999; Fearon 
and Laitin 2000). In certain cases, extremist actors may 
purposefully instigate violence to prevent moderates from 
compromising with the other group. In Xinjiang, whenever 
Uighurs rioted against the Chinese government, the targets 
of violence were often Han Chinese. In the aftermath of the 
2009 Urumqi riot, one could argue that inter ethnic divi­
sion will become even more significant, as evidenced by the 
retaliation of Han Chinese mobs against the Uighurs two 
days after the initial riot. It seems clear that the series of vio­
lent incidents since the 1990s has strengthened inter ethnic 
boundaries between the two groups and pushed the Uighur 
community further away from the Han Chinese commu­
nity and the Chinese state.
4. Rigid Group Boundaries, Discrimination, and Violence
The rigidification of the group boundary between the Ui­
ghurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang has two broad implica­
tions. First is increased discrimination by the members of 
each group against the other. Although the Han Chinese 
are the politically and economically dominant group in 
China, mutual contempt and distrust between the two 
groups run both ways.
There are multiple forms of discrimination. One is re­
pression of Uighur culture, language, and religion by the 
Chinese state. The Uighur language has been increasingly 
sidelined in the educational systems in Xinjiang, and efforts 
to increase teaching of Mandarin Chinese with the ultimate 
goal of achieving linguistic assimilation have been renewed 
(Dwyer 2005; Schluessel 2007). The Chinese government 
has also exerted strict control over Islam, cracking down on 
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“illegal religious activities” by “defrocking suspect clerics, 
breaking up unauthorized scripture schools (madrasa), and 
halting the construction of mosques” (Bovingdon 2004, 33). 
Uighurs also face discrimination in the urban job market. 
Because Han Chinese are more dominant in the private 
sector in urban areas, hiring favors Han Chinese or ethnic 
minorities who can speak the Chinese language well; many 
job advertisements explicitly state that only Han Chinese 
can apply. Thus Uighurs who have gone through the Uighur 
education system have a strong disadvantage in finding 
jobs in the private sector. As a result, the unemployment 
rate among Uighurs is reportedly much higher than among 
Han Chinese.9 Beyond this job discrimination, many Han 
Chinese also tend to think of Uighurs as backward, dirty, 
lazy, and ungrateful for the economic development brought 
to Xinjiang by the Han Chinese. In addition, oftentimes 
Han Chinese associate the Uighurs with criminal activities 
and consciously distance themselves from them (Kaltman 
2007). The promotion of the discourse on “war on terror,” 
has led more and more Han Chinese to treat Uighurs as po­
tential terrorists. Uighurs, for their part, do not hesitate to 
show disgust and contempt toward Han Chinese whenever 
possible. Some spit on the ground when they pass Han Chi­
nese people. Some Uighur marketplace vendors refuse to do 
business with Han Chinese customers, or charge exorbitant 
prices when they do. This mutual discrimination is cyclical 
and self­reinforcing.
The second and more important implication of the rigid 
inter group boundary in Xinjiang is that it makes commu­
nication across groups extremely difficult, which paves the 
way for eruptions of violence. In an effort to explain inter­
ethnic cooperation, James Fearon and David Laitin point 
out that the breakdown of inter group peace is often due to 
the lack of formal or informal institutions to regulate infor­
mation and prevent opportunistic individuals from taking 
costly actions – such as the instigation of violence (Fearon 
and Laitin 1996, 717–18). Social order and inter ethnic coop­
eration require institutional mechanisms to provide infor­
mation across groups. Such cooperation is easier for groups 
that have dense inter group networks, which “allow for 
cheap and rapid transmission of information about individ­
uals and their past history” (Fearon and Laitin 1996, 718). In 
contrast, in situations where inter group social networks are 
less developed or simply do not exist, “cooperation and trust 
across groups cannot be supported by punishment strate­
gies that condition individual behavior” (Fearon and Laitin 
1996, 719). One unfortunate outcome might be that one 
group would indiscriminately punish all members of the 
other group, which would lead to the complete breakdown 
of inter group peace. These insights have strong empirical 
implications. In his study on communal violence in India, 
Ashutosh Varshney points out that civic engagements be­
tween the Muslim and Hindu communities, can often make 
neighborhood­level peace possible by promoting commu­
nications: “prior and sustained contacts between members 
of different groups allow communication between them to 
moderate tensions and pre­empt violence” (Varshney 2002, 
47). The lack of such sustained engagements across groups 
creates conditions for inter group violence. In Xinjiang’s 
case, where the Uighurs and Han Chinese maintain such 
strong boundaries against each other, no meaningful civic 
engagement can occur.
5. Policy Recommendations
This paper has sketched the dynamics of inter ethnic rela­
tions between Uighurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang at the 
meso level. Utilizing Barth’s approach to ethnicity, I have 
shown how social encounters and external categorizations 
have permitted rigid inter ethnic group boundaries to be 
constructed and maintained in everyday life in Xinjiang. 
Because of this rigid boundary between the two groups, Ui­
ghurs and Han Chinese are segregated in their own social 
spaces without much mutual communication. Accordingly, 
mistrust and discrimination run rampant. Furthermore, 
a rigid group boundary hampers inter group civic engage­
ments, defeating efforts to dispel mutual distrust and 
discrimination and also making the inter group dynamic 
extremely susceptible to violence.
This analysis of the Xinjiang case thus sheds light on the 
social conditions for communal violence. Of course, the 
9 For example, see “Why the Uighurs Fear 
China’s Boom,” Time, July 14, 2009. 
255IJCV : Vol. 4 (2) 2010, pp. 244 – 256Han: Boundaries, Discrimination, and Interethnic Conflict in Xinjiang
actual immediate causes of each incident of violent out­
bursts vary, from a little brawl on the street to a rumor of 
mistreatment and injustice committed by the other group. 
In the wake of these incidents, the rigid intergroup social 
boundary blocks opportunities and defeats efforts to lessen 
their impact. Scholars who are interested in discrimina­
tion, prejudice, and violence will find it worthwhile to pay 
attention to the social processes that create discrimination 
and prejudice, and to how they are perpetuated through 
inter group dynamics in various social contexts.
This analysis also illuminates some policy recommen­
dations for inter group peace in Xinjiang. Setting aside 
dramatic measures such as partition or secession, one 
logical policy recommendation for preventing or reducing 
the chances for future violence in Xinjiang would be to en­
courage mutual communication and civic engagement.10 In 
addition, the Chinese government needs to rethink its cur­
rent policies in Xinjiang to show more respect for Uighur 
culture, language, and religion, and to provide more space 
for cultural expressions. The government also needs to 
take legal action to prevent blatant discrimination against 
Uighurs, especially in the job market. Most importantly, as 
our discussion of the implications of rigid group boundar­
ies shows, serious efforts should be made to foster civic 
engagement across group lines at the meso level. NGOs 
that aim to facilitate dialogue between the Uighur and Han 
Chinese communities should be encouraged. In particular, 
civic associations that include members from both groups 
should be promoted (Varshney 2002, 292). Currently, most 
efforts from the international community are aimed at sup­
port of Uighurs’ political and cultural rights in Xinjiang. 
These are certainly noble goals. However, if the interna­
tional community has genuine humanitarian concern 
about preventing the future eruption of violence, it needs 
to invest in a civil society in Xinjiang that includes both 
Uighurs and Han Chinese. Educational programs that 
facilitate dialogue and reconciliation across group lines 
should be emphasized. Moderate people from each group 
should be identified and encouraged, with an emphasis 
on how to build more cross­cutting cleavages between the 
two groups. These are certainly no easy tasks to achieve, as 
the authoritarian state of China puts more constraints on 
the development of such civic life. However the Chinese 
state as well as the international community must realize 
that only through efforts to foster mtual communication 
and engagements across these two groups will peace and 
stabiliy be achieved in Xiniag.
10 For a discussion of more drastic measures to 
prevent inter ethnic violence, see Kaufmann (1996).
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